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The publication in 1978 of a report on The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation 
by a committee headed by the economist James Meade marked the first fundamental 
study of the UK tax system commissioned by the Institute for Fiscal Studies. Many of 
its main recommendations centred around a shift away from taxing income and 
towards taxing expenditure. Tax incentives to save and reductions in marginal rates of 
income tax were designed to improve incentives   to earn and to invest income. Such a 
shift characterised the UK tax system from 1979, albeit without acknowledging the 
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“Our Report     is a joint effort, but   I take this opportunity   of expressing a   personal 
view. Our economy has become too stagnant; restoration   of standards of living   and 
many desirable   increases in economic welfare    depend upon high productivity. At 
the same time   a modern humane   society demands   that effective action should be 
taken   to prevent poverty   and   to remove unacceptable inequalities of opportunity, 
wealth and privilege”. (James Meade, Preface to the Report on The Structure and 









A persistent   concern in Les Hannah’s work has been with the interaction of market 
mechanisms, economic theory and institutions. The early work on industrial 
concentration picked up Coase’s question as to when and why firms internalise 
market operations while also emphasising that the drift to a high level of industrial 
concentration in UK manufacturing by 1971 coincided with its comparatively poor 
international economic growth performance2. The two-volume history of the   UK 
electricity supply industry necessarily involved discussion   of the interaction of time 
and economics, whether   in the attempts   to price   peak-hour electricity   efficiently   
or in the   use of discount rates   in the appraisal of proposed fixed capital   investment 
projects3. It also pointed to the paradox   whereby the government initiated the 
construction of a natural monopoly grid so as to stimulate competition in the 
generating section of the industry. Time, taxation and the growth of large companies 
underpinned Les’s study of the development of occupational pension schemes in the 
UK4.  
This interest in how decisions were made, of how they were shaped by the 
interaction of markets, institutions and individuals was evident from the very earliest 
days of the Business History Unit. Located on the fourth floor of the Lionel Robbins 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Martin Daunton, James Foreman-Peck, Les Hannah, John Kay, Lord Mervyn 
King, Peter Scott, Douglas Todd and participants at the conference in Reading in March 2017 for their 
comments on an earlier version of this paper. All responsibility for errors of fact and understanding 
remain mine.  
2 Hannah and Kay, Concentration in Modern Industry; Hannah, Rise of the Corporate Economy; 
Coase,’ Nature of the Firm’. 
3 Hannah, Electricity Before Nationalisation 
4 Hannah, Inventing Retirement 
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Building at the LSE, the unit was established in 1978 with Les as its first Director. In 
his later  inaugural lecture on  11th October   1983 as holder of the first established 
chair in  Business History at the LSE, Les emphasised both the need to pay closer 
attention to entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial decisions, but also to find a theoretical 
and empirical mixed approach  for ‘the analysis  of change (which)  is at the heart of 
the entrepreneurial function’.5 While Les emphasised the variety of incentives and 
motivations for entrepreneurial behaviour, he also acknowledged that ‘in tax policy 
making…it seems   to be quite widely accepted   that reducing the taxation of income 
will increase   entrepreneurial efforts’.6 Incentives and wealth creation were strong 
themes in the 1979 general election, as too was taxation. In discussing how to 
improve incentives for work and wealth creation, the tax system was a favourite target 
for criticisms. That tax system had itself been buffeted and distorted   by the inflation 
of the 1970s, and it   was both   to remove its inconsistencies and to improve 
incentives for effort that the Institute for Fiscal Studies (established in 1969) invited 
the economist James Meade to chair a committee to undertake a review of the tax 
system. That committee published its   Report in 1978.  
      The reception of that   report forms   the focus of this article for two main reasons. 
Firstly, in the period since   1979 there   has   been growing concern   with inequality, 
and in particular with inequality   of wealth. Was there any evidence at the time of the 
Meade Committee of how a concern with incentives might coincide with moves to 
halt and begin to reverse the post-war trend to redistribute wealth in the UK? In short, 
why might a government, elected to improve   incentives and opportunities, receive a 
history which pays at least as much attention to its contribution to increasing wealth 
inequality in the UK from 1979. Secondly, given that the Meade   Committee’s report   
was concerned    with the intergenerational transfer and distribution of wealth, how 
and why were its proposals for taxing the transfer of unearned wealth blocked? How 
and why does this contrast   with the reception   of other sections of the report, 
whether on marginal rates of income tax, the balance between direct and indirect 
taxation, and the offering of tax-relief on life-cycle savings. Since the question   of 
how institutions, systems, individuals and   economics   interact is a persistent concern 
of Les’s work, it seems appropriate to ask how a major report tackling just such issues 
as were embedded in the tax system was received and used following its publication 
in 1978.  
  
The Meade Committee 
 
      The Meade   Committee was   established   in 1975, its chairman James Meade 
beginning     work in July and the committee meeting for the first time in October of 
that year. James Meade was Emeritus Professor of Political Economy at the 
University of Cambridge. In 1977 he and Bertil Ohlin, were to be awarded the   Nobel 
Laureate in Economics for their work on international trade   and international capital 
movements. The committee of which Meade was chair   included some of the 
brightest academic economists of a younger generation including John Kay, Mervyn 
King and Tony Atkinson, initially in 1975 as research secretaries   but from 1976 as 
full members of the   committee. Tony Atkinson subsequently resigned from the 
committee, ostensibly because of being appointed   to the Chair   of Political 
Economy at University College London.  
                                                 
5 Hannah, Entrepreneurs 
6 Hannah, Entrepreneurs, p. 17. 
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      Appropriately in   1975, when the annual rate of inflation   was running at 25%, 
part of the committee’s remit was to review the system of direct taxation, just one of 
whose difficulties was its struggle to accommodate the effects   of the inflation of the 
1970s. As Meade explained in a letter to Geoffrey Howe, the Shadow Chancellor of 
the Exchequer,  the intention of the Committee’s  proposed tax   reforms were to  
“provide the   most favourable  tax background    for the development of  private   
business enterprises and in particular   for small business”; to stop the capital market 
being the “hideous mess which it is  at the moment due to the interplay  of  the present 
income tax, corporation   tax and capital gains tax”; to provide a  check in the  shift 
from income to expenditure taxation on a government’s  ability to  use inflation to 
increase its revenue; and to end  at both ends of the income scale  marginal   tax rates 
at their “present absurd  levels”. 7 The committee had been established  and the Report 
‘originally  commissioned   by the Institute for Fiscal Studies  after   ministers 
rejected   calls by the Sandilands   Committee and others for a Royal  Commission   
on the whole of the taxation system,   on the grounds that   it was too large an 
undertaking”. 8   Throughout its two-year   life, in which remarkably   it produced a 
report of 519 pages (including   37 appendices)   the Meade committee   was tracked 
by the Conservative Party   Taxation Committee (CPTC), chaired by David Howell.9 
The   Treasury and the Inland Revenue also kept a keen eye on the committee’s 
activities, and equally the IFS ensured that the Treasury and Inland Revenue were 
kept informed of its progress.10  
      The Meade Committee, the CPTC and the Treasury were all agreed that the 
highest marginal rate of taxation of 98% (an 83% marginal rate of income tax added   
to an investment income surcharge of 15%) was too high. For the CPTC the  tax rate 
of 83% alone caused difficulties in recruiting senior industrial management when  “at 
83%, our top  rate  on earned income   leaves a take-home   on marginal earnings  of 
only about a third that of  an American  executive (top rate 50 per cent)  or  a German 
executive  (top rate 53 per cent)”.11 The Treasury was well aware of industry and CBI 
claims about the disincentive and recruitment effects of high marginal tax rates, but it 
found    such claims difficult to demonstrate. 12 While the   marginal rate of taxation 
affected incentives, the average   tax rate was the greater influence on the 
redistributive content   of the tax system. Unsure of the extent to which very high 
marginal rates affected work incentives, the Treasury, like the   Meade committee, did 
think that there was “a good case    for aiming   to reduce the ‘top   rate to at least 75% 
and possibly to 70% (or even 65%)”. However, in February 1979 its view was that 
“the case for going further   than this does not seem strong’. 13  
 
      By the mid 1970s the basis of taxation   was once again a matter of heightened 
economic and philosophical interest. The proceedings   of one such conference 
meeting of economists   and philosophers in May 1975 were gathered together in a 
volume entitled Utilitarianism and Beyond edited by the economist Amartya Sen and 
                                                 
7 Meade Papers (hereafter Meade) 6/2 (1977a) 
8 The National Archives (hereafter TNA) T364/149 (1977b), paras. 23, 24, 29,  32.  
9 The Thatcher  papers (hereafter THCR) 2/6/1/36 (1977) 
THCR 2/6/1/27 
10 TNA T366/4, para 2. 
TNA T366/205 (1976a) 
11 THCR 2/6/1/35 
12 TNA T366/383 
13 TNA T171/1450, paras. 5, 6, 7a, 9.   
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the philosopher Bernard Williams.14 Coming to the fore    at this time was the work of 
one conference speaker, James Mirrlees, whose work was well known to Meade, if 
not entirely agreed with. Aware that many arguments for low marginal tax rates for 
the rich were ‘premised   on the odd assumption   that any means of raising the 
national income is good, even if it diverts part   of that income from poor to rich’, 
Mirrlees was surprised that his ‘rigorous   analysis   of income taxation in the 
utilitarian manner’ did not provide   an argument   for high tax rates’. In general, 
Mirrlees’   conclusion was   that ‘income tax  is a much less   effective   tool   for 
reducing  inequalities   than has often   been thought’.15 More widely, academic work 
by Mirrlees, Feldstein, Atkinson, Fair and Rawls was incorporated   by Rachel Lomax 
at the Treasury in a paper   surveying academic research on tax structures and theories 
of redistribution.16 Such Treasury   research fed   into its five-year Medium Term Tax 
Strategy whose shape was becoming clear by 1978. Priority was given to ‘improving 
incentives’ by  some strengthening of the higher rate  bands, introducing a longer 
reduced rate band   of significant length, having a modest reduction in the basic rate to 
32%, and  reducing the   top rate of taxation from 83 per cent to 75 per cent. Income 
tax   reductions would be financed by an increase in VAT over the medium term.17 
      This shift from direct   towards indirect taxation was in line with the thinking and 
proposals of the Meade Committee. The idea of an expenditure   tax   went back   in 
the post-World War II   period most   obviously   to Nicholas Kaldor’s   book, An 
Expenditure Tax (1955). Indeed, when Meade   sent Kaldor  a  draft copy of the 
committee’s   report, Kaldor wrote thanking him and admitting that  while  he had not 
yet had time to  “study it in any detail I found it very gratifying  that you advocate   an 
Expenditure Tax  on much the same lines as I  did when I wrote my  book 23 years 
ago!’18 Before Kaldor,   the intellectual roots of   an expenditure tax stretched through 
Marshall, Pigou and Mill and back to Hobbes. 
      By an expenditure  tax is not meant  an indirect  (VAT)  tax on current 
expenditure, but rather  a tax on   an individual’s total  consumption across a year, this 
being measured by   calculating  the  difference  between the  individual’s receipts  
and payments during tat year. Receipts would comprise  both personal income, such 
as wages, dividends and rent, as well as  capital receipts, such as from the sale of 
capital  assets  where the  sale proceeds  was not then fully used to purchase  assets of 
an equivalent value. Gifts and other   windfall income   were   included in total 
receipts     from which non-consumption expenditure (as on assets, repayments of past 
borrowings, or simply   an increase in the individual’s money balance) could then be 
deducted. The balance left   once deductions   for receipts   were made   was held to 
represent   expenditure on consumption   and was taxed.  
                                                 
14 Mirrlees, “Economic Uses” 
15 Mirrlees, “An Exploration” p. 208. 
Diamond and Mirrlees, “Optimal Taxation I” 
Diamond and Mirrlees, “Optimal Taxation II” 
Atkinson, ‘How Progressive”. 
16 Atkinson, “Bringing income distribution”, 
Fair,  “Optimal Distribution” 
Feldstein, “Distributional Equity”. 
Feldstein, “Optimal Progressivity” 
Mirrlees, “An Exploration” 
Rawls, “Some Reasons” 
TNA (1975). 
17 TNA T378/88, paras. 6, 12, 14, 16, 19. 
18 Meade  6/11 
 7 
      While the intellectual provenance of an expenditure tax, its main attraction had 
been   its ability to avoid   the ‘double taxation;’   of savings   occasioned by income 
taxation. Keynes’s  view  of an expenditure tax was that   while it was ‘perhaps   
theoretically   sound,   it is practically impossible’19, although work by the economist 
Irving Fisher on the   similarity   between calculating    the net savings   and dis-
savings (spending out of cap[ital) of individuals and businesses was  slowly realised   
to have made  expenditure taxation   practicable. In the United States,   in September 
1942, the Treasury   presented   to Congress a proposal   for a progressive   spending 
tax    as their   principal   suggestion for war finance, although the Finance   
Committee of the   American Senate greeted the proposal with considerable hostility. 
In the UK, the economist   Nicholas Kaldor wrote his book An Expenditure Tax 
(1955) as an offshoot of his work   as a member   of the Royal Commission on the 
Taxation   of Profits and Incomes which was appointed in   1950.20  
  An expenditure   tax necessarily    involved   lifetime taxation of the use of wealth, 
either on the basis of a universal expenditure tax based on a list of registered assets 
and/or using a Two-Tier Expenditure Tax which placed a surcharge on levels of 
expenditure above a basic rate band. Ideas for the taxation of wealth   included   the 
ingenious PAWAT (Progressive Annual Wealth Accessions   Tax) scheme which 
taxed donees   rather than donors and taxed on a progressive   basis the possession   of 
wealth   as if the donee was to live to be 85 years of age. 21 Such proposals were made 
in a context in which other Labour Party and Labour government schemes for taxing 
wealth had run into the sand.  
       
 
The administrative response 
 
Opposition   to the committee’s   proposals   for an expenditure    tax and a new 
approach   to the taxation of wealth came from   varied sources. Perhaps the   most 
curious response to the Committee’s proposal for an expenditure   tax was that   of the 
Inland Revenue. As with the Treasury, the IFS had sought to keep the Inland Revenue 
informed of the Committee’s progress in meetings chaired by Sir William Pile, Board 
Chairman of the Inland Revenue.22 In response to the Meade Report the Inland 
Revenue   wrote a 79-page   analysis of an expenditure   tax, a copy of which J H 
Gracey of the Inland Revenue sent to Meade in January 1980, as it and other papers 
relating to the Revenue’s examination of an expenditure   tax were made available to 
the public.23 The Revenue emphasised what it saw as the practical difficulties  of 
implementing an expenditure tax and argued   that the Meade committee  had   failed 
to appreciate   the extent to which  the tax system was a political  construct and not 
simply   an economic structure   with   efficiency as its main concern: 24 
                                                 
19 Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax, p. 12. 
20 Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax, p. 7. 
21 IFS, Structure and Reform, pp. 317-318. 
22 TNA T364/149 (1977a) para. 1.  
23 Meade 10/17 (1980) 
24 Meade 10/17 (1978), paras. 7, A3, D3-4. 
Kaldor, Expenditure Tax 
Vickrey, “Expenditure”. 
Musgrave, Theory of Public Finance   
Shoup, Public Finance. 
Prest, “A tax?” 
Prest, “The Expenditure Tax”. 
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 “The tax system is not   a seamless and   logically consistent   web. It is, we think, 
inherent   in the nature of the political debate   that this should be so;   and the idea   of 
a universally acceptable tax structure, which no longer needed   to respond   to the 
political and economic   requirements of the day, strikes us as a chimerical one”. 25 
 
The Inland Revenue argued that inconsistencies existed within   the existing system, 
precisely because they reflected “deliberate policy decisions   in response    to the 
different   and often   conflicting   political and economic   pressures of the last 
generation or so”. Yet, it was precisely a   tax system which provided incentives for 
effort, rather than enshrining past political deals,   which the Meade committee   
sought   to   establish. This interest   in creating a dynamic system was captured in a 
letter which John Kay wrote to J H Gracey of the Inland Revenue, shortly after the 
publication of the Meade Report: 
 
“I enjoyed   your description   of the kind of tax system   which the report   advocates 
as being one of fiscal snakes and ladders. It is certainly true   that a number of 
commentators   on the report   have seen an element of paradox in it. Personally, I see 
no paradox at all. It seems to me that   this is exactly   what the tax system   of a 
country   that really cares   both about fairness and about incentives would be like. 
Snakes and ladders implies   that we reward   effort, and if the effort is not sustained 
we take the rewards   away again. The paradox is mainly seen by those   who look at 
issues through the somewhat   distorting spectacles of party politics”.26 
 
Having written their 79-page analysis of the Meade Committee’s   proposals for an 
expenditure tax, the Inland Revenue   were contemptuously dismissive of the entire 
report. Branding the Meade Report’s approach to the reform of the tax system as 
‘somewhat misconceived’ the Revenue reiterated their view that: “The Report is   
disappointing: its original proposals are not practicable, and its   practicable   
proposals are   not original”. 27 
  
      This Inland Revenue’s view was not shared by the Treasury28 which was critical 
of the condemnation of “the Report as   entirely irrelevant   and useless – as the 
Revenue appears to do”. Instead, observing that it was always “easy to do a hatchet 
job on a theoretical analysis of this kind”, Treasury officials acknowledged that there 
was wide recognition that the tax system was “urgently in need of reform”. They also 
questioned why, if the Report   was “as way out   and as irrelevant   as the Revenue   
seems to imply”, the Revenue had not sought to “to influence    the course and 
approach of the exercise at an early stage” since the Meade Committee had done 
“their best   to keep us   fully informed   of the lines   on which they were working, 
and officials   participated   in their decisions   from time to time”.29   
 
      Where the Treasury was concerned about the report was in the impact on the 
proposed expenditure tax on incentives. In a meeting with the IFS, the Treasury’s 
                                                                                                                                            
Prest, Public Finance 
25 TNA T364/149 (1977b), para. 21. 
26 Meade 6/1 
27 TNA T364/149 (1977b), paras. 23, 24, 29, 32.  
28 TNA T364/149 (1978c) 
29 TNA T364/149 (1977a), para. 5. 
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Barry Kalen   complained   that the potential substitution effects of a two-tier 
expenditure tax (TTET) and the impact on incentives of an expenditure tax in the 
absence of a tax-free threshold had received insufficient attention.30 The two-tier 
expenditure tax   would in effect be two separate taxes,   one for the lower tier and the 
other for the upper   tier of a taxpayer’s expenditure. Citing A R Prest’s September 
1959 Economic Journal article, Kalen complained that ‘the issue of incentives   to 
work is completely ignored’. Similarly   Todd noted that “no arguments   are 
developed properly on possible disincentive effects, e.g. the willingness   to work or 
take risks”  which he regarded as  “a great weakness   in the Report   since the opening 
chapter   places such a great emphasis   on efficiency   and yet at the   end of the day   
the arguments virtually disappear   and other criteria concerned   more with equity   
become more apparent”.31 Yet, as his Treasury colleague, John Odling-Smee   argued 
to Todd, such criticism missed the point that Meade’s was “a concern for efficiency 
and the minimisation of distortions” throughout the whole system, rather than with a 
particular substitution effect. As this approach revealed ‘weaknesses and anomalies’ 
then these could be addressed, not least in Meade’s view by moving onto an 
expenditure base. 32 However, in general, the Treasury recognised the ‘substantial   
economic and social benefits’ from adopting Meade’s principles of taxation, albeit in 
“in a piecemeal   and evolved fashion” and with the proviso that “the   concept of a 
slow progress   of evolution towards   a better system   need not include   complete 
adoption of an expenditure tax objective”. 33 
 
The political response 
 
      Whatever the contrasting   administrative responses   from the Inland Revenue and 
the Treasury, ominously     the most   outright   opposition came from Conservative 
politicians. When Meade presented an      exposition of the Report’s main principles 
and recommendations to a group of Conservative MPs on 22nd November 1977 prior 
to its official publication, he drew a belligerent response from his audience. 34 
Following the meeting Meade   wrote to its organiser, Sir Geoffrey Howe, expressing 
his “surprise at the unmitigated   hostility shown   by the majority of your group”..35 
Howe’s main   defence was that “unmitigated hostility”  was “not the real spirit   of 
our reaction” but rather a “political abhorrence, born   of many Finance   Bill Standing   
Committees,   of anything   which involved   complex   replacement   of  familiar 
fiscal machinery   when simplification   and adaptation , of course, on a basis of 
principle, would do as well”.36 By way of an olive branch Howe   commended to 
Meade   chapter 3   of the Conservative Party’s   recently published   pamphlet The 
Right Approach to the Economy, as well as Howe’s own   recent talk   to the 
Addington Society   which was reprinted in that year’s   British Tax Review. 37 
      Whatever Howe’s emollient   words, there was   no disguising the   Conservative 
Party’s   determined opposition     to suggestions   of further taxation of capital. This 
had been a consistent theme   from at least the mid 1970s, when the CPTC had 
                                                 
30 TNA T366/205 (1977b) para 6. 
31 TNA T364/149 (1978c) para 11. 
32 TNA T364/149 (1978d) 
33 TNA T364/149 (1977a) para. 7 
34 Meade 6/2 (1977c) 
35 Meade 6/2 (1977a)   
36 Meade 6/2 (1977b) 
37 Howe, “Reform”. 
Howe, Joseph, Prior and Howell, Right Approach 
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expressed   its forthright determination to end the ‘political’ taxation of the rich, 
particularly through capital transfer   tax”.3839 A good   part of the future Thatcher 
Conservative governments’   taxation policy   was to be found in the Meade   
Committee’s Report. The Thatcher   governments introduced reforms   designed   to   
encourage saving and equalise the post-tax returns on investment. Maximum tax rates 
of investment income were reduced   from 98% to 40% and the equalisation of the 
marginal taxation of income and capital gain removed the incentive to convert income 
into capital gain. In 1984, income tax relief on premiums payable for life assurance   
was abolished and the tax-free schemes for saving in cash or equities were established 
in 1987. In 1988 personal pensions were introduced which enjoyed   the same tax 
relief   on contributions, fund income   and withdrawals as employer-based 
occupational pensions. As the Meade Report had envisaged, most life-cycle   savings 
came to qualify   for expenditure tax treatment.40 Taxation featured strongly in the 
1979  general election, although the Meade Report  was barely mentioned in the  
campaign.41  Under pressure   from Geoffrey Howe, Mrs Thatcher     did agree     to 
make a shift   from direct to indirect   taxation. The basic rate of income tax was 
reduced from 33% to 30% in the government’s first Budget   in June 1979 and again 
to 29% in 1986, 27% in 1987, and 25% in 1988. Cuts were also made to higher   tax 
rates, from 83% to 60% in June 1979 and from 60% to 40% in 1988.42 Tellingly, 
when pressure on the PSBR in 1993 required   tax increases in two Budgets in that 
year, the two Chancellors   introduced a   package of   tax increases which, while in 
terms of revenue raised, reversed   most of the tax reductions   of the late 1980s, they   
did not fall on income   but on VAT for which the standard   rate was raised   from 
15% to 17.5% and extended   to include   domestic fuel. 43   
      What was more contentious and not in the spirit of the Meade Report    was the 
reduction   of the top rate of income tax   from 60% to 40% in March 1988. As the 
political philosopher Gerry Cohen noted, this could be held to offend against the 
principle of ‘justificatory community’, a concocted notion which required the relevant 
agents to justify their behaviour to the community.44 By 1988 the Conservative 
government had moved a long way from the concern of the Conservative Taxation 
Committee   in 1975 about “awarding a ‘payrise’ to many executives   just to make 
them work harder”. 45 The change in the highest marginal income tax rate was greater 
than that which the Meade Committee (70%) and the Treasury (65% at most) in 1979 
had thought likely   to have any necessary   effect on work/leisure incentives.46 It also 
raised questions as to the extent to which   any individual   could be truly said to 
‘deserve’ their income. Aside from luck, if talent caused an individual to prosper, the 
political philosophical question   arose of the extent   to which an individual ‘owned’   
the beneficial proceeds   of his/her talents. On such an issue there was common 
                                                 
38 THCR 2/6/1/36 
39 THCR 2/6/1/35 
40 Adams, Browne and Heady, “Taxation”.  
Banks and Diamond, “The Base”. 
41 Kay, “Meade Report”, p. 47. 
42 In moving in 1988 to the 40% and 25% income tax rates, the Treasury had been influenced by a 
paper written by Mervyn King for the Financial Markets Group at the LSE in late 1987. Personal 
communication from Lord King. 
King, “Prospects”.     
43 Giles and Johnson, “Tax Reform”. 
44 Cohen, “Incentives”. 
45 THCR 2/6/1/35 
46 Brown and Sandford, Taxes and Incentives.. 
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ground between Meade, Hayek and Rawls. Hayek thought that “the inborn as well as 
the  acquired   gifts of a person clearly have a value to his  fellows   which does not 
depend  on any  credit   due to him for possessing them”.47  For Rawls, his Difference 
Principle represented, in effect, an agreement   to regard the distribution   of natural 
talents as a common asset.48 If the principle was the redress of undeserved 
inequalities, then it was consistent to argue for a redistribution of resources to mitigate 
the intergenerational transfer of relative advantage.  Although Hayek objected   to 
Rawls’s use of the term ‘social justice’, he welcomed his argument that   rather than a  
particular   system or   distribution  being designated as ‘just’, it was   the  principles 
of justice   which defined “the crucial   constraints   which institutions  and joint  
activities must  satisfy  if persons engaging  in them are to have   no complaints 
against them”.49    
 
Wealth and public fixed investment 
 
      If   the Meade Report   proposals   for the encouragement   of saving, the 
equalisation   of the post-tax   rates on   investment, and a shift   between direct and 
indirect taxation, were all   reflected   in the  Conservative governments’   taxation 
policies, the committee’s  proposal for the taxation of wealth  were conspicuous by 
their absence from policy-making. Inheritance tax continued to be levied on donors 
rather than donees, its contribution   to public finance revenue dwindling down to 
0.5% of forecast   UK tax revenue   in 2011-12.50 Principal residences     continued to 
be exempted   from Capital Gains Tax on their sale while second and additional 
homes had their capital gains rolled up into inheritance tax at the death of their owner. 
Owner-occupiers continued to live free   of taxation in the imputed rental income   
from their property following the abolition of Schedule A taxation in 1963. Changes 
in the distribution   of wealth and income particularly favoured   the highest reaches of 
the income and wealth scales. Across the   1990s,   the top 1% of wealth holders 
increased their share of marketable wealth from 17%   in 1991 to 23% by 2001. The 
top 0.05%  of income earners   went back to enjoying their pre-World War II share of 
income after tax, this being  2.41% in 1997 compared with 2.37%  in 1937. 51  
      Perhaps as importantly, the   Conservative governments   sold off some of the 
public stock of assets   such that the public sector asset net worth fell from   77.1% of 
GDP   in 1980-1 to 62.86% in 1990-1. However, it fell even further in the post-
Thatcher 1990s from the   62.8%   of 1990-1, to   21.6%   in 1995-6 and to 15.6%   in 
1999-2000.52 The eye-catching programmes   of public asset sales were the sale of 
public housing and the ‘privatisation’ of nationalised industries. The sale of public 
housing represented an essentially irreversible transfer of capital assets. By selling a 
property at below market price (because it was without vacant possession), by 
definition the opportunity was lost of selling it in the future when it would have 
become vacant. One approach might have been to have included in the original sale 
price, provision for replacement with suitable adjustment     for depreciation. As 
James Foreman-Peck pointed out in 1982: “To do otherwise     is to dispose     of 
public assets in a fashion arguably     not in the best interests   of the tax-payer   who 
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originally financed   them;   or alternatively   to redistribute    wealth   from the State 
to the council house-buyer”. In terms   of future rental income foregone, because  the 
level and annual rate of increases of rent were higher in Conservative-controlled than 
in Labour-controlled authorities, the opportunity costs of encouraging the sale of 
stock was greater in Conservative authorities encouraging sales than in the Labour 
authorities  prohibiting sales. 53  
      Policy towards public and   owner-occupied   housing   was   intensively debated 
in the Treasury   at roughly the same time as the Meade Committee was meeting. In 
the Treasury Ian Byatt was very keen to reintroduce Schedule A, but the Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Peter Shore, was opposed to the taxation of imputed 
income. Shore was keen to use the removal of higher rate tax relief as a quid pro quo 
for reducing subsidies and consequently raising council house rents, so as to appease 
Treasury calls for an improved rate of return on these capital assets. Although the tax-
relief offered to owner-occupiers cost less than subsidies to local authority tenants, for 
some in the Treasury like Douglas Wass it was seen as having a useful incentive 
effect. Wass thought that the scrapping of higher-rate mortgage tax relief would 
remove an important incentive to managers who had no inherited capital. 54  Here 
again was access to capital viewed as an important incentive     for middle 
management. In fact MIRAS (Mortgage Interest Relief At Source) was gradually   
withdrawn   by the Thatcher governments.  
 
     Robert Solow referred   to James Meade as the last great utilitarian, and perhaps 
the Meade Report was one of the last systematic statements of a utilitarian outlook.55 
The sections of the report on the taxation of unearned wealth reflected a view of 
Meade’s   like that of Tawney that the redistribution of wealth was at least as 
important as that of income. Wealth allowed ‘access’   and for Tawney what was 
‘repulsive’ was not income inequality but that “some classes should be excluded from 
the heritage of civilization which others enjoy’.56 For Meade too, fundamental to the 
creation   of a more enterprising, dynamic economy and society was the redistribution 
of wealth, the removal of “unacceptable inequalities   of opportunity, wealth and   
privilege”57, and the weakening of concentrations of power. 
      It was not simply   that the government was opposed   to the disturbance   of 
fundamental reform, but rather that   it fundamentally   disagreed   with Meade’s   
views on the   redistribution of wealth. In correspondence with Margaret Thatcher and 
Keith Joseph, Howe would refer   to Meade as a ‘socialist’58  and while Meade 
regarded himself as liberal (like Keynes) he did share the concerns   of Tawney and 
would probably not have   dissented   from Crosland’s view in 1956   that “the largest 
inequalities   stem not from   the redistribution   of earned incomes, but from the 
ownership of inherited capital’.59 
 
Taxation and inequality after the Meade Report 
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      Since the publication of the   Meade Report   there has been steady reshaping of 
the structure of taxation, notably in the shift from income tax and towards taxes   on 
expenditure, of which Value Added Tax is the prime example. In 1978 36.6% of 
government current account revenue came from income tax and 9.6%   from VAT.60 
By the time of the successor to the Meade Report, the Tax By Design (2011) Report of 
the IFS committee chaired by James Mirrlees, income tax was expected   to contribute 
28% of government tax receipts and VAT 17.8%. Notably in the 2011-12 tax year, the 
expected contribution to   total tax receipts from the taxation of capital was small: 
Capital Gains Tax (0.6%); inheritance tax (0.5%); stamp duty   on land (1.05) and 
stamp   duty on shares (0.6%). Using data on the  annual tax receipts in cash(so not  
on an accrued basis) and comparing   1978-79   with 2015-16, the share  of total  
receipts from income   tax fell   from 39%   to 31.6%, while receipts from VAT   rose  
from   10.2% to  21.6%. Amongst other   sources of revenue, the share from national 
insurance remained static, as too did revenue from fuel duties. The share of revenue 
from tobacco duties fell   from 5%   to 1.8%, and that form corporation tax   from 
8.1% to 5.3%.61 Without fanfare, the UK moved towards taxing expenditure, a move 
which was reinforced by the tax-relief offered for saving (the postponement of 
expenditure) in the various ISAs and PEPs and occupational pension schemes.62 As 
marginal tax rates fell, so the incremental attractions of saving in these tax-free 
instruments may have declined in theory, but the practical ability to build-up a large 
tax-free capital sum over a life-time remained attractive.    
      The main asset held by households remained their home, and as the proportion of 
the electorate owning their home grew, so too did the taxing of inheritance become 
more politically sensitive. Changes in the availability of credit and historically low 
real interest rates contributed to rising property prices, and to asset prices(equities for 
example) in general. While income inequality fell by some ten percentage points from   
1938   to the 1970s   and then rose by some   ten percentage   points between 1977 and 
1991, inequality of wealth always remained much greater than that of income. 63 The 
Gini coefficient   for the distribution   of wealth was far higher than that for net 
incomes.64  Between 1979 and 1989   there was a stabilisation in the share of wealth 
held by the top 10% of taxpayers.65 In 1976 the Gini coefficient   was 66% and 65%   
in 1995. However, by 1999   the top 1% had increased their share of marketable net 
wealth to 23% of the total, from 17%   in 1991. To some extent, this rise in the 
inequality of wealth distribution   may have reflected the effects of the earlier   
increased income inequality, to which were added the effects   of the stock market   
boom in the late 1990s and the rise in house prices. 66 Yes, while inequality of wealth 
increased   in the 1990s, so too   did the number of voters who felt vulnerable to 
inheritance   tax. Given the decision   not to pursue a  Meade-style PAWAT approach 
to the taxation of inheritance  and capital transfers, such liabilities   could be lumpy   
and were a concern to many who did not regard themselves as wealthy, and who were 
likely to invoke arguments of earned entitlement. The concentration of wealth in 
housing among those with modest estates alongside rapid house price increases was 
largely responsible for the increase in the number of IHT payers from 18,000 to 
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34,000 (from 3% to 6% of deaths) between 1998/99 and 2006/07.67 While larger 
estates had larger investments in shares and other assets, many who newly fell into the 
IHT net were in illiquid homes, in which they remained as the value to them of the 
home exceeded that to others of the house. Yet while causing resentment to many, 
IHT raised little revenue. Even following a decade of rising housing wealth, when the 
proportion of death estates liable for inheritance tax more than doubled in a decade—
increasing from 2.3% of the total in 1996–97 to 5.9% in 2006–07 the revenue raised 
was still small.68 Inheritance tax was paid on only 3% of estates in 2009/10 and raised 
less than 0.5 per cent of all tax revenue. 69 This mismatch   between the political 
controversy which they excited and the amount of revenue   which they raised   did 
nothing to increase   the political appeal of wealth taxes. Even when previously 
another Kaldor-inspired idea, the Capital Gains Tax, had been introduced in the 1965 
Budget, it raised a disappointing level of revenue. 70 
      Arguments persist over the use of the tax system to create incentives for work and 
entrepreneurship, while also addressing the inequality which was of concern to 
Meade. In his 2015 book Inequality: What Can Be Done?, Tony Atkinson pushed 
again for a more progressive income tax structure and for a revisiting of ideas for 
greater taxation of wealth.71 In his 2014 book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 
Piketty expressed concern at how ‘when the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate 
of growth of output   and income’, it gives rise to ‘arbitrary and unsustainable 
inequalities    that radically undermine   the meritocratic values on which democratic 
societies are based’.72 The recent Brexit vote is seen by some as an expression of 
dissatisfaction by groups who feel that they no longer benefit from economic growth, 
and that, to reprise Tawney, who feel  ‘excluded’ from the benefits enjoyed by others. 
One of the lessons of Les’s work over the years is that capitalism, for all of its faults, 
survives by adapting and changing. As it enters another period of disruptive 
technological change, it will need to find ways to ease grievances about 
intergenerational inequality, of inequality of opportunity and of exclusion from the 
benefits of economic growth. One lesson from this study of the Meade Report is that 
attempts to tax capital will meet strong administrative and political resistance and, if 
implemented, will not produce the expected level of revenue. In contrast, gradual, 
quiet change which taxes expenditure is a more acceptable and fruitful approach to 
taxation, and one which preserves incentives to earn income. Quiet, gradual changes 
to the expected marginal efficiency of capital were also the main concern of the 
central chapter eleven of Keynes’s The General Theory. Keynes argued for 
government to address the marginal incentives for fixed capital investment, so as to 
then raise the level of effective demand in a low-interest rate economy. The most 
effective change often occurs quietly over time, rather than being achieved through 
grandiose state projects or announcements. In today’s different circumstances, the 
designing of incentives to reward entrepreneurship and efficiency remains as central 
an issue as it was in the 1930s and again in the late 1970-s and 1980s when Les was 
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spearheading the development of business history with his informed blending of 
history and economics.     
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